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Theories as Mere Conventions 
1. Expunging Conventional Elements. 
Conventionalism, as an approach to understanding scientific theory, is hardly 
new. Mach1 construed the Newtonian relationf=ma as a conventional characteri-
zation of the unobservable quantity "force." Poincare2 argued that the geometrical 
structure we attribute to space is a matter of convention. These two examples are 
interestingly different. Poincare writes as a mathematician: whatever the true 
laws of dynamics may be (provided they satisfy very general and uncontroversial 
conditions) they can be expressed in terms of either Euclidean or non-Euclidean 
space. Mach writes as an experimentalist: the only fundigyental way you can tell 
about forces is to measure masses, times, and distances-i.e., masses and ac-
celerations. Yet these widely different points of view lead Mach and Poincare to 
the same general view regarding certain theoretical claims. 
To Duhem3 is attributed the thesis that theoretical as opposed to experimental 
laws are essentially conventional and irrefutable. The link between irrefutability 
and conventionality is firmly established in Duhem. And the modern representa-
tive of this view, though in somewhat attenuated form, is Quine.4 Quine's thesis, 
though bracketed with Duhem's, is somewhat different, for Quine sees the poles, 
"conventional" and "substantive," as unrealized ide.als. That is, every statement 
in our scientific corpus partakes of both analyticity and empiricalness. The dis-
tinction is one of degree: some statements are more resistant to counterevidence 
than others. 
Quine's view will be our starting point. As metaphored by Quine and Ullian, 5 
our body of scientific knowledge should be viewed as a web. At the center of the 
web are the truths of logic and mathematics-the statements most resistant to 
modification in the face of recalcitrant experience. At the periphery of the web 
are statements most directly related to experience, to what happens to us. These 
are the occasion sentences on which our whole body of scientific knowledge is 
to b~ based. At the center, then, according to this picture, we have sentences that 
are highly structured and regimented, but evidentially remote from our ordinary 
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Figure 1. 
experiences. At the edges, we have sentences that are more or less directly war-
ranted by ordinary experience, but that have little or no structural connection to 
the rest of our body of beliefs. The general picture is reflected in figure 1. 
Let us now consider how this view of things would be changed if we were to 
drop from our representation the arbitrary elements. That is, if logic is thought 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
of as being arbitrary or conventional, let us delete from our picture the elements 
that correspond to logic. The view we have then is illustrated in figure 2. There 
is still a web, embodying many interconnections, on which experience impinges 
only at the periphery. We may think of the internal nodes of this web as represent-
ing "theoretical" terms, while the nodes at the edges represent "observation" 
terms. 
But then, as Craig6 showed us, the theoretical terms are arbitrary and inessen-
tial additions-conventional elements that, but for convenience, could be elimi-
nated. If we follow this path, we arrive at the prettier web illustrated in figure 
3, in which there is a central node (the axioms of the physical theory, expressed 
in purely observational terms) connected by deductive spokes to the observational 
consequences on the rim. 
If this picture of knowledge strikes you as too simple, you can, as I once 
pointed out, 7 impose your own favorite structure, involving your own favorite 
theoretical entities. More explicitly: you can start with a theory T1, choose your 
favorite theoretical entities, your favorite (consistent) laws concerning these enti-
ties, and be sure that there exists a theory Tz that (a) employs as its only theoreti-
cal entities those you have chosen, (b) has as its theoretical laws those you have 
chosen, (c) has exactly the same observational consequences as T1, and (d) re-
quires those laws for the deduction of the observational consequences. 
It appears that only the edge of the web is nonconventional. If we eliminate 
all the conventional elements we are left with figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 
All this has been predicated on a very shakey assumption - namely that the 
edge of the web, the observation sentences, can be sharply distinguished from the 
interior of the web, sentences involving theoretical terms. But to reject that dis-
tinction leads to an even worse state. If we associate irrefutability with conven-
tion, as we have been doing, then even the observation sentences begin to seem 
conventional. As Quine pointed out long ago, 8 even observation sentences are not 
uniquely determined by what happens to us. Alternatively, we may reflect that 
any observation sentence, if it has content at all, may turn out to be in error. 
If we give up the distinction between theoretical and observational vocabulary, 
and disregard the conventional elements, we are left with a web of knowledge that 
has neither interior nor periphery. 
This is clearly unproductive; we must somehow escape this consequence. The 
way to do so is to take a closer look at conventionality and the way in which it 
functions in scientific knowledge. Up to this point I have been using the term 
"convention" in what I take to be an ordinary philosophical sense. This is the sense 
discussed by David Lewis, 9 in which arbitrariness is the essence of convention. 
Indeed, Lewis writes "It is redundant to speak of an arbitrary convention. Any 
convention is arbitrary because there is an alternative regularity that could have 
been our convention instead" (p. 70). 
To say this immediately sets lights flashing. Poincare certainly did not regard 
Euclidean geometry as conventional in this sense! In fact, he (mistakenly) argued 
that Euclidean geometry would always be the geometry of choice for physical the-
ory, on the ground of its simplicity. This is exactly to claim (a) that the choice 
of a geometry is conventional, and (b) that there are reasons for choosing one con-
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vention over another. If there are reasons for choosing one convention over an-
other, these conventions are not "arbitrary." It is hard to believe that any conven-
tions are entirely arbitrary; "arbitrary convention" seems to me more like an 
oxymoron than a redundancy. But be that as it may, we may certainly single out 
a class of ·conventions that may be adopted for epistemic as opposed to 
nonepistemic reasons. 
Conventions that are adopted for nonepistemic reasons, we shall call 
arbitrary. Conventions that are adopted for epistemic reasons, we will not call 
arbitrary, even though "there is an alternative regularity that could have been our 
convention instead." 
And what is a "nonepistemic" reason? Familiarity, elegance, and the like. I 
shall also construe simplicity as nonepistemic, though, as is well known, some 
philosophers take the simplicity of a scientific theory to be grounds for taking it 
to be acceptable, or true, or both. Epistemic reasons I take to be reasons expres-
sible in terms of predictive power or probability. They will become clearer 
shortly. The general thesis is that scientific theories are mere conventions, but not 
arbitrary conventions. The reasons for choosing one theory rather than another 
are to be epistemic in my narrow sense. 
2. Generalization, Observation, and Error 
We consider a set of alternative languages, L, L', etc. Each language contains 
a set of 
(a) terms, 
(b) formulas, 
(c) axioms, and 
(d) rules of inference 
in the usual way. We suppose that 
(i) First-order logic and set theory are included. 
(ii) "Logical" or "analytic" relations among terms are derivable. 
(iii) Probability as well as provability, as relations between sentences and sets 
of sentences, is defined. 
(iv) An inductive as well as a deductive logic is provided. 
With regard to (i), the intent is merely to have on hand as much mathematics 
as we need to do statistics and as is involved in whatever theories we are con-
cerned with. 
With regard to (ii), the intent is merely to capture those truths, if any, that are 
to be regarded as characteristic of the language in question. It is the burden of 
the third section of this paper to elucidate this vague characterization. 
With regard to (iii), we must be a little more explicit. Probability is not taken 
to be subjective. It is not to be understood as a Carnapian degree of confirmation. 
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It is not (as both of these views would have it) based on a measure defined on the 
sentences of the language. 
Probability is: 
(1) defined for a given language L, 
(2) relativised to a corpus of knowledge K, 
where K is understood to be a set of sentences in L, 
(3) syntactically definable, 
(4) based on the statistical syllogism, and 
(5) interval valued. 
The statistical syllogism has the form: 
Between 25 % and 30 % of A's are B's. 
Charlie is an A. 
That's all that is known in K that counts. 
Therefore the probability of "Charlie is a B," relative to K, is [.25,.30]. 
The trick to making this notion of probability fly, of course, is spelling out in a 
noncircular way the condition embodied in the third premise. 10 I will simply as-
sume, for present purposes, that it can be done. The upshot is that probability as-
sertions have the form 
ProbL(S,K) = fp,q], 
where L is a specified language, Sa sentence in that language, and K is an actual 
or hypothetical set of statements of that language. fp, q] is just a closed subinterval 
of[0,1]. 
With regard to (iv), I assume, what is somewhat controversial, that we can 
come to accept statements on the basis of strong but inconclusive evidence. This 
is what I take inductive logic to be about. Just as with probability, I shall simply 
assume for present purposes that it makes good sense to talk about accepting state-
ments on the basis of strnog but inconclusive evidence. I shall furthermore as-
sume that we can operate with a purely probabilistic rule of acceptance. 
Roughly the rule has the following form: if the probability of S, relative to K, 
is at least 1 - E, accept S. More exactly, however, we must specify K, and we must 
say where S is to be accepted. (If we look on logic as atemporal, we can't have 
S belong to K, for its probability would already be [l, l], which is not our intent.) 
It turns out that a useful structure for present purposes can be represented by 
three levels of rational corpora. We take K* to be the corpus of incorrigibilia: 
it comprises logical and mathematical truths, analytic statements, and possibly in-
corrigible observation statements. The next level of corpus, K, is the evidential 
corpus. It contains evidential certainties, indexed by a real number p. A statement 
is acceptable as an evidential certainty if its probability, relative to the set of in-
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corrigibilia, is at least p. Finally, the corpus on the basis of which we act, and 
relative to which the probabilities of the various possible outcomes of our actions 
are defined, is the corpus of practical certainties, K' . This is indexed by a real 
number p' smaller than p. A sentence S is acceptable as practically certain if its 
minimum probability, relative to the evidential corpus, exceeds p' . 
We thus have two parameters, p and p', to account for. I think a sensible story 
can be given, but this is not the place for it. 11 
We need just a little statistical inference. I claim, without argument here, that 
we can inductively infer a proportion in a population from the observation of a 
proportion in a sample. This makes use of a set theoretical truth: 
For perfectly reasonable n, E, and o, the proportion of n-membered subsets 
of a finite set A that exhibit a proportion of Bs that is within E of the proportion 
of Bs among As in general is at least 1 - o. 
The argument also depends on the fact that the "third condition" of the statistical 
syllogism may be satisfied with regard to a given subset of A, relative to plausible 
bodies of knowledge K. 
From these premises, we obtain: The probability that this particular sample, 
having its given proportion of Bs, exhibits a proportion that is close to that among 
As in general, is [1 - o,1.0]. 
Assume that our counting is incorrigible, so that the data is in K*, and that 
1 - o is greater than p, and we have shown that "The proportion in our sample 
is rand the proportion in A differs from that in the sample by less than E" is entitled 
to be in our corpus K of evidential certainties. Since this statement entails "The 
proportion of As that are Bs is in the interval [r - E, r + s]" the latter statement, 
too, may be in K. 
We need one more piece of machinery to examine the possibility that scientific 
theories may be construed as mere, but not arbitrary, conventions. We must con-
sider also, corresponding to each language L, its metalanguage ML. In each case 
ML contains L as a sublanguage. In addition, ML is assumed to contain a single 
nonlogical primitive relation, O(X, S, t), which is to be interpreted thus: the in-
dividual X, our agent, an individual, society, group, or whatever, observes the 
state of affairs or event denoted by the sentence S of L, at some time earlier than t. 
With the help of this metalinguistic predicate, we can define two important 
classes of sentences of L: 
Dl VO (X) = {S I (3t) (O(X, S, t) & S)} 
These are X's veridical observations. 
D2 EO (X) = { s I (3t)(O(X, S, t) & S)} 
These are X's erroneous observations. 
K 
Aa, Ab, Ba, ... 
.l.p' 
K' 
%(A, B) e [p, q], Bd 
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O(X, 'Aa', t) 
.l.p 
MK 
%(0(X), EO (X)) E [p, q] 
"Cb" E VO(X) 
Figure 5. 
Finally, we add one principle to our inductive logic: that if a statement in L 
has a probability greater than p relative to the evidential metacorpus, then it may 
appear in the object language corpus of evidential certainties. 
Figure 5 may help to give the general idea of the structure I have in mind. The 
corpus of incorrigibilia in the language L seems to serve no useful purpose; logi-
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cal truths and the like will enter the corpus of evidential certainty by being highly 
probable (having probability 1) relative to the metacorpus of evidential certain-
ties. Observation statements themselves may appear in K when they are the result 
of observation: what is required is that they not be known to belong to any class 
of observations in which error is rampant. (If the observation is made under bad 
light, it is more likely to be erroneous - and we can come to know this in our 
metacorpus.) 
For an example of how this works, let us consider the familiar ravens. This 
will also constitute an initial example of my main point. Consider two languages, 
L1 and Lz, that both contain the predicates "is a raven" and "is black." Lz contains 
as a meaning postulate the generalization that all ravens are black. This is con-
strued as a priori, as a linguistic constraint, embodied in the language itself. 
Let us now consider the question, "Given a set of observation reports, how do 
we choose between the two languages?" (This reflects Mary Hesse's distinction12 
between observation statements and observation reports. The observation report 
is the linguistic entity entered into the laboratory notebook. The observation state-
ment represents the corresponding fact. It is bad form to correct an observation 
report; but observation statements may sometimes turn out to be wrong and need 
to be corrected.) 
Suppose our agent X has accumulated a long list of observation reports in his 
incorrigible metacorpus; statements such as O(X, "a1 is a raven", t4). These state-
ments may be the same in either language. In particular, there is no inconsistency, 
even in ML2, between 
O(X, "a1 is a raven", t4), and 
O(X, "a1 is not black", t4), 
though of course the two mentioned statements are inconsistent in both Lz and 
ML2. In either case, our agent is simply reporting his observations. 
The difference is that in L1 we have no reason to doubt any of the mentioned 
statements. It seems perfectly natural for the mentioned statements to pass 
directly into the body of evidential certainties K1. Given the vagaries of human 
observation, we may suppose that even under the best of circumstances, not all 
observed ravens will have been reported to be black. Most will be, and relative 
to the evidence embodied in K1, it may become practically certain, in K1 ' that 
almost all ravens are black; that is, "%(is a raven, is black) s [.9,1.0]" may be 
a member of the practical corpus. (Even if, unnaturally, all the observed ravens 
have been observed to be black, this could be the strongest statement acceptable 
on the basis of probability in the first language.) 
This would allow our agent to be pretty sure that the next raven he saw would 
be black, or that a random raven would be black. It does not, in itself, provide 
any grounds for supposing that a nonblack thing is a nonraven. 
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Consider the other language, in which it is a priori true that all ravens are 
black. Given the same set of observation reports, including some reports of non-
black ravens, the situation of our agent Xis quite different. Now he knows, on 
syntactical grounds alone, that some of his observation reports are erroneous. 
Some observation statements, corresponding to observation reports, must be re-
jected. Which ones? How many? 
We are free, of course, whichever language we adopt, to suppose that all or 
almost all of our observations are erroneous. This is silly skepticism; we have 
no grounds for making any such assumption. So I propose that we adopt the fol-
lowing principle: 
P1 The minimization principle: Attribute no more error to your obser-
vations than your language requires you to. 
This principle tells us how many observations we are required to regard as er-
roneous, but it doesn't specify which ones. It is not unreasonable not to be able 
to tell whether it is the observation report "a is a raven" or the observation report 
"a is not black" that is wrong. We could reject them both, but that would fly in 
the face of the minimization principle. The reason we want to know how many 
observations of each kind are in error, is that we want a statistical basis for deter-
mining long-run error rates for the various kinds of observations. A natural prin-
ciple to follow (though it is not as compelling as the previous one) is this: 
P2 The distribution principle: Distribute the error frequencies as evenly 
as possible among the (syntactic) kinds of observation statements. 
Given these two principles, we have a way of arriving at observed error frequen-
cies in the incorrigible metacorpus. 
Given these observed error frequencies in a sample of observation reports, we 
can, other things being equal, infer long-run error frequencies among the various 
kinds of reports. Statements asserting that in general the frequency of erroneous 
raven judgments lies between (say) 0.0 and 0.1 may now appear in the 
metacorpus of evidential certainty. 
What should be the basis of our choice between the two languages in question? 
One natural criterion would be the predictive observational content of our corpus 
of practical certainties K'. That is, it seems reasonable to let past observations 
fend for themselves; theoretical understanding is notoriously difficult to distin-
guish from theological speculation; and prediction other than observational terms 
is hard to evaluate. 
So what is "predictive observational content"? It is easy to find instances. Add 
to our metacorpus the sentence O(X, "an is a raven", t44), and see how many new 
sentences are added to our corpus of practical certainties. Generalize that idea: 
add to the incorrigible metacorpus a set of observation reports of each possible 
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sort in equal numbers, and see what happens in the corpus of practical certainties. 
What happens depends on the values of p and p' ; on what the original contents 
of the metacorpus is, on the language, and on the number of statements added. 
We will assume that this sensitivity to the levels of the evidential and practical 
corpora, and to the numbers of hypothetical observations added, is relatively 
unimportant or can be minimized. If this is so, we can adopt a third principle: 
P3 The principle of maximizing predictive observational content: Of two 
languages, adopt that that provides for the greatest predictive obser-
vational content in the corpus of practical certainties. 
Applied to our example, this principle leads to the preferability of one lan-
guage or another according to the relative frequencies with which various obser-
vations have been made. For example, if among our observation reports there 
have been a relatively large number of reports of nonblack ravens, then both 
"nonblack" and "raven" must be regarded as highly suspect or undependable if we 
were to speak L2. In particular, the situation might be so bad that, if one were 
to add O(X, "a11 is a raven", t44) to the incorrigible metacorpus, one could not 
even add "a11 is a raven" to the evidential corpus, and therefore neither that state-
ment nor "ai 1 is black" to the corpus of practical certainties. 
On the other hand, if almost all observed ravens have been reported to be 
black, the addition of the observation report to the metacorpus would lead to the 
addition of "a11 is black" to the practical corpus. Furthermore, the addition (in 
language L2) of O(X, "a34 is not black", t22) to the incorrigible metacorpus will 
lead (in L2) to the inclusion of "a34 is not a raven" in the corpus of practical cer-
tainties. 
In the case in which very few nonblack ravens have been reported, Li may 
lead to actions appropriate to the anticipation that an arbitrary new raven will be 
found to be black, on purely statistical grounds. (We will not in these circum-
stances be led to bet against that possibility at any odds.) But we will not be able 
to infer from the report that something is not black to the practical certainty that 
it is not a raven, and we will not be able to infer from the conjunction of reports 
that k objects are ravens to the conclusion that all k of them are black. Both of 
these inferences will go through if we adopt L2. 
The upshot, for this simple example, is this: If practically all reports conform 
to the generalization that all ravens are black, L2 is the language of choice. If a 
significant number of reports conflict with that generalization, we must assume 
that our observations are so in error that L2 offers no advantages over Li, and 
indeed may suffer a loss in predictive observational content. (In fact, if the error 
rates are high enough, nothing may even get into the evidential corpus K2 on the 
basis of past observations.) 
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In summary, this approach generalizes in the following way: 
fewer a priori 
constraints 
observations without error 
little observational prediction 
no loss due to error 
more a priori 
constraints 
observations prone to error 
more observational prediction 
some loss due to error 
3. Scientific Change 
There are four cases of scientific change to consider. There is the addition of 
theory, there is the deletion of theory, there is replacement of one theory by an-
other, and there is the addition to observational vocabulary. (The last mentioned 
is one that has not received much attention in the literature of scientific theory 
change, though it is obviously an important one.) 
Let us first consider the addition of a theoretical generalization to a body of 
scientific knowledge. The theoretical generalization embodies new constraints. 
If these constraints lead to changes in our statistical knowledge concerning the 
errors of observation (or measurement), it can only be that we have been forced 
to allow for an increase in observational error. 
Thus we assume the same observational vocabulary; we assume greater errors 
of observation; but in compensation, the predictive observational content of the 
corpus of practical certainties under the new a priori constraints will be larger 
than previously. We get new predictive content at a given level of practical cer-
tainty. 
Note that there is nothing inductive about this. Our new generalization is not 
accepted because it has, relative to the evidence, a high degree of confirmation. 
In fact, its confirmation, relative to the body of knowledge expressed in the old 
language, is 0. (Relative to L1 the probability of "All ravens are black" is 0, as 
Carnap already recognized. 13) Relative to the new language, its probability is 
1.0: that is the probability of "All bachelors are unmarried," or "AH ravens are 
black" in the language Lz. Generalizations are not (directly) supported by their 
instances, but by their contribution to our foreknowledge. This may, but need 
not, be somewhat counterbalanced by a loss of precision in our predictive 
statements. 
Note that the situation we face is the choice between two given languages. 
There is no question of using evidence to derive a new constraint. In this regard, 
also, then, the acquisition of new scientific knowledge is anti-inductive. We do 
not learn a new theory from experience; we test a new theory against an old one, 
by means of experience. 
The second case to consider is that in which scientific progress consists in the 
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deletion of an old generalization or law. I suspect that this is far more rare than 
some philosophers, Popper, for example14 , have maintained. Rather than refut-
ing an old generalization, refined testing most often seems to lead to the replace-
ment of one theory by another. But refutation no doubt does occur. When it does, 
what happens on the model I am depicting is that a group of new observation 
reports leads to new statistical error distributions. These new statistical error dis-
tributions may lead to a decrease in the observational content of the corpus of 
evidential certainties, and do lead to a decrease in the predictive observational 
content of the corpus of practical certainties. At this point, it may be that the lan-
guage that lacks the generalization or law in question may lead to a practical 
corpus of greater predictive content. 
Note that refutation does not occur as Popper and some other philosophers 
suggest. We do not put a theory to the test, note that the test results do not conform 
to the theory, and then reject the theory. Rather, an isolated test of the theory that 
does not yield the predicted result contributes to the data on the basis of which 
we derive our distribution of errors of observation. That this effect is not often 
pronounced (high school laboratory tests of the law of inertia do not contribute 
significantly to the refutation of Newtonian mechanics, nor to the statistics of er-
ror distribution in the measurement of mass and distance) does not show that it 
does not exist. In some cases there is an extremely large body of data on which 
the error distribution is based. In such cases it can look as though a theory is being 
refuted. Note also that according to the conventional treatment of error in 
physics, no set of measurement results is ruled out as impossible by any theory. 
If we take error into account, no experiment can refute a theory. 
The third and most common form of theoretical change is the replacement of 
one theory by another. Again, we assume that the observational vocabulary is the 
same in each case. We compare directly the error statistics and the corresponding 
predictive observational contents of the corpus of practical certainties of the two 
theories. 
Only one philosopher has made a serious attempt to account in rational terms 
for the replacement of one theory by another. This is Isaac Levi. 15 For Levi the 
problem is particularly difficult, since on his view (as on mine), within the frame-
work provided by one theoretical language, direct refutation is impossible. If an 
experiment is performed, and the results contradict the predictions of the theory, 
it is the results that must be rejected as false, not the theory. On my view, the 
erroneous results contribute statistically to our knowledge of the theory of error 
of the kinds of observations involved. 
Levi's solution is that when things get bad enough, we may be led to contract 
to a body of knowledge in which neither the original theory nor its rival appears. 
When we weigh Newtonian mechanics against relativity mechanics, we first con-
tract to a body of knowledge with no mechanics. Then we use our evidence as 
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a basis for new expansion. Replacement is thus construed as contraction, fol-
lowed by expansion. 
On the view that I am advocating, this two-stage process is not necessary. We 
may compare directly the predictive observational contents of the corpora of 
practical certainties of the two cases, corresponding to the two languages. 
The fourth and final case to consider is when the two languages differ in the 
observational vocabulary. Since I have rejected the incorrigibility of observation 
statements, it is necessary to say a bit about what a change in observational 
vocabulary comes to. What constitutes an observational term is dependent on the 
corresponding error theory and on what constitutes the level of evidential cer-
tainty. The basic idea is that a term is observational if an observation report mak-
ing use of that term constitutes adequate evidence for including the corresponding 
statement among the evidential certainties of a given level of acceptance. 
The kind of change in vocabulary I have in mind here includes the South Seas 
islander learning to distinguish dependably among the kinds of snow, or the Es-
kimo learning to distinguish dependably among the varieties of wave patterns. An 
even simpler and more direct example, however, is provided by scientists learn-
ing to see through a microscope or telescope. Galileo's inquisitors, after all, didn't 
need to refuse to look through his telescope. They could have looked through it, 
and what they would have seen were flashes of light, their own eyelashes, and 
difficult-to-identify shapes. It takes the student of histology a significant period 
of time to learn to see through a microscope. Observation, like any other skill, 
must be learned. 
The reward of learning to observe, whether we consider the individual or the 
group of individuals, is the same as always: an increase in the predictive observa-
tional content of the corpus of practical certainties. 
If we look at the change of observational vocabulary as learning to see some-
thing new, we may suppose that the old observational predicates are included in 
the new ones; what we achieve is a refinement of our observational vocabulary. 
This case is somewhat more complicated than the preceding three cases, since 
we may consider two kinds of comparisons between the old and the new corpus 
of practical certainties. We may consider the predictive observational content of 
the practical corpora, constrained to sentences in the old vocabulary. Or we may 
look simply at the absolute numbers of predictive observational consequences in 
the two cases. The latter approach is not as question begging as it might appear 
to be, due to the requirement that observational predicates must be predicates that 
we can dependably apply. Thus one may imagine (what is no doubt the case) that 
phrenologists could learn to distinguish head bumps that modern people can no 
longer dependably detect. Well and good. But the predictive observational con-
tent of the phrenologist, given the addition of bump reports in the metacorpus of 
incorrigibilia, would presumably not exceed that of his modern nonphrenological 
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counterpart, even if we include bump reports among the predictive observation 
statements to be taken account of. 
4. Conclusions 
This view of scientific knowledge and scientific change bears on a number of 
contemporary issues. 
It bears on the question of incommensurability of alternative theories, for ex-
ample. Kuhn, 16 Feyerabend, 17 and others have sometimes written as if there were 
no way of directly comparing theories and their successors. If the view of theories 
as mere conventions that I have been outlining is meritorious, it is easy to see the 
truth in such a view. It is quite true that two competing theories are not compar-
able in the sense that we can look at the evidence and decide that one of them has 
(or should have) a larger degree of confirmation than the other, or that one has 
been tested and refuted while the other has not, or that one has been tested more 
severely, or that one is more testable than the other. Two theories are not com-
pared directly in the light of the evidence. But given a body of observations-that 
is, given a set of 0-statements in the incorrigible metacorpus-we can find a 
direct basis of comparison of two languages in the predictive observational con-
tent of the corpus of practical certainties. 
A serious question that might be raised concerns the apparent ubiquity of lan-
guage change in the history of science. As I have sketched scientific change, all 
change, other than mere statistical inference, reflects a change in the language of 
science. Is it really the case that every time a universal generalization is confirmed 
(as we naively say), what is going on is that we are choosing between languages? 
We must distinguish two cases. The natural history case, in which we look at 
ravens or swans and arrive at a universal generalization, it seems to me, does in-
volve change of language. It is not that we decide that "almost all swans are 
white," and then discover that Australian swans are black. It is that we take as 
a matter of certainty (convention) that all swans are white; and then, given the 
evidence from Australia, must decide - nontrivially - whether there are ade-
quate anatomical grounds for regarding the southern black birds as also swans. 
It is quite clear that there are issues in such a case as this that only an ornithologist 
is in a position to deal with. 
The other case is the one in which we already have a body of structured scien-
tific knowledge to use. This corresponds to what used to be called "demonstrative 
induction." We can decide that all samples of the compound X melt at about 45 
degrees Celsius, on the basis of a small number of experiments, because it is a 
part of the general theory- i.e., language-that each pure compound has exactly 
one melting point. All we have to do is to determine that one sample of X melts 
at 45 degrees to determine that all samples do. 
Can we decide between any two languages for science? For example, between 
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French physics and English physics? The answer is clearly negative. French 
physics and English physics (assuming they embody the same laws) will have the 
same number of predictive observational consequences in the corpus of practical 
certainties. Indeed, they will have the same predictive observational conse-
quences, though expressed in a different vocabulary. So the difference between 
French physics and English physics is exactly a matter of arbitrary convention. 
The difference between Newtonian physics and Einsteinian physics is also a mat-
ter of convention, but while it is mere convention, it is not arbitrary convention. 
Einstein's physics allows us to predict a bit more. 
This way of looking at scientific languages might be thought to have conse-
quences for the issues of scientific realism and instrumentalism. This is true, but 
it might also be thought that since I am arguing that scientific theories are mere 
conventions, instrumentalism is the only plausible ontological view. This is mis-
taken. It reflects a confusion between mere and arbitrary convention. If the differ-
ence between theories quantifying over different sorts of entities were a matter 
of arbitrary convention, then perhaps instrumentalism would be warranted. But 
I have just argued that the choice between alternative scientific languages is an 
epistemological issue. We have epistemological grounds for choosing one theory 
over another. And this suggests that we can have epistemological grounds for 
quantifying over one set of entities rather than another. 
In addition, the framework suggested weakens the distinction between "obser-
vational" and "theoretical" terms profoundly. Given modern instrumentation and 
modern training, it seems clear that many of the properties of cells must be 
regarded as observational properties. Before the invention of the microscope, 
some of these same properties must have been taken to be unobservable and theo-
retical. There are indeed complexities to be dealt with here, but the point that 
emerges quite clearly is that nothing definitive-in particular no form of 
instrumentalism-emerges as entailed by the view described. 
To view scientific theories as mere but not arbitrary conventions offers a 
framework in which the rational succession of one scientific theory by another 
can be understood; it offers an alternative to the view of scientific theories as sub-
jective, arbitrary, and subject to personal whim and social pressure, rather than 
the demands of rationality. What views of the world the evidence we happen to 
have supports is an objective, rational matter. This is not to say that experience 
and reason dictate what theory we should hold of the world, but that experience 
and reason dictate which of two alternative theories (languages) is preferable. 
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